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Despite the increasing focus on non-dualistic and materialist approaches in education technology 
studies, the materiality of the body has not been adequately examined. Because of the heavy 
orientation towards affordance, interaction, participation, inclusion and access at the interface or 
between various spatial and liminal settings, the subject's body has been addressed and analysed as 
a non-corporeal construct, primarily at an abstract, theoretical or textual level. This paper intends to 
complement existing research by proposing a carnal move that would enact an ethnography of 
corporeality. It will do so by doing two things: first, by drawing from Don Ihde's human–technology 
relations to foreground the body in technology use; and secondly, by adapting Marcel Mauss's 
conceptualisation of body techniques for a carnal methodological move in investigating technology-
enhanced learning and digital literacies. 
 
Practitioner Notes 
What is already known about this topic  
• Sociocultural and materialist approaches in education technology studies have paid 
little attention to the “real” body. 
• Within the climate of increased commodiﬁcation of education and heavy reliance on the use of 
various technologies and devices for learning and teaching, our bodies have been neglected. In fact, 
we have or are expected to be more machine-like as our electronic devices are claimed to extend 
our cognitive capacities. 
• Within the social science as a whole, the body has manifested itself in various ways— social body, 
collective body, technologised body—however, mostly focused on its representations through 
discursive thought or analysis. 
What this paper adds 
• The paper offers a re-examination of the role of the body in educational technology and points to 
interesting possibilities. 
• It proposes the conceptualisation of body techniques as a way to engage with the visible body in 
human–technology relations based on Don Ihde’s work. 
Implications for practice and/or policy 
• The paper proposes Ihde’s body typology as a theoretical and methodological approach that will 
allow educational technology researchers to engage with bodily practices when investigating 
human–technology relations. 




The academic discourse on technology-enhanced learning has paid little attention to the body as a 
site of experience or practice, except when the perceived natural body has a disability or is involved 
in sports or art performances. Forging an alliance with poststructuralist, feminist and 
phenomenologist scholars, albeit loosely, opens up the possibility of undeleting and ﬁnding the body 
in educational technology research. It provides insights into how our discourses and practices may 
include our bodies in ethnographic studies. Generally, technology-related research in education has 
taken an instrumental view or rationality, which argues that technologies are as good or as bad 
according to the ends to which they are used by users. The notion of cyborg in the 1990s has 
induced people’s lives with unwarranted utopian hopes and dystopian fears. Hence, the 
instrumental view is considered the most informed or balanced sentiment. However, it is still a 





Broadly speaking, educational technology research has not entertained debates that problematise 
the body, be they phenomenological, post-structuralist, feminist or others. Sociocultural alongside 
materialist approaches have successfully shifted from techno-centric and technocratic discourses to 
critical accounts about gender, equality, participation and inclusion towards democratic and 
emancipatory politics. However, the persistence of modern categorisations and the depiction of the 
body as “otherness” (Shilling, 2004, 2007; Turner, 1994) remain. For instance, while actor–network 
theory approaches have been promoted in educational research (Fenwick & Edwards, 2010, 2012) 
and current digital literacies literature (eg, Gourlay, 2012; Leander & Lovvorn, 2006; Leander & 
Rowe, 2006) has informed and inﬂuenced the networked sociality of the object–subject and mind–
body dualisms where the Cartesianised subject is acted upon by non-human entities in a network of 
relations, the tendency has been to focus on sociocultural approaches or other issues that maintain 
a muted body. The post-humanist and materialist approaches in digital literacies or educational 
technology literature have cast physicality out into mere inscriptions. The social model, in spite of its 
critique of the technical model, actually concedes the body to textual performances and is only a 
matter of concern when taken ill or impaired. The biological and cultural are pulled apart as the 
body is denied of its materiality as methodological practices/approaches ultimately solely 
acknowledge the disembodied subject, or more precisely a body denied of history, affect, meaning 
and agency. It is rather a pivotal point that as non-humans take stage in actor–network approaches 
and are made “actants,” the body remains powerless or inanimate. Just like Hughes and Paterson 
(1997), this paper seeks to attend to the theoretical sidestepping that has resulted from 
sociocultural approaches with respect to its treatment of embodiment. To recapture the lost 
corporeal space and body, this paper will argue for the expansion of the sociocultural and relational 
approaches towards an emphasis of “body-as-ﬂesh,” rather than a disembodied “body-as-text” 
notion read through technical affordances. Becoming up close with bodies could prove to be 
insightful and capture the impact of spatialities and regimens—revealing ways in which pedagogy or 
technology disciplines bodies and promotes different dispositions to learning or literacy practices 
(Watkins, 2011). 
 
Relational materialist approaches have recently been more evident in educational technology 
studies, particularly in digital literacies. One of the key successes of such studies is the recognition 
of the material arrangements that affect learning beyond an essentially mental or conscious set of 
interactions. Despite the materialist focus, the materiality of the body has not been adequately 
considered. The subject’s body has been addressed and analysed as a non-corporeal construct, 
primarily at an abstract, theoretical and textual level. Moreover, though it may still hold true that 
dualistic methods are still used in investigating the human–technology relations, this paper is more 
optimistic and takes the view that the reason for the seemingly absent body in technology-enhanced 
learning (TEL) research is due to the heavy orientation to meaning-making, interaction, participation, 
inclusion and access at the interface or between various spatial settings. Hence, this paper’s 
contribution is to complement existing research by proposing a carnal move that would facilitate 
and explore an ethnography of corporeality. It will do so by doing two things: ﬁrst, body–technology 
relations are foregrounded using Don Ihde’s human–technology relations (1990); second, Marcel 
Mauss (1979) body techniques as adapted by Crossley (2007) will be considered for a carnal move in 
educational technology research. It attempts to bring educational technology research within the 
purview of discussions of the body and embodiment towards a carnal ethnography. 
 
Missing body in educational technology 
The typical academic approach to education technology research examines the users in terms of 
various social and behaviourist categories as cognitive agents, self-regulated learners, active 
participants, members of communities of practice, social ties, afﬁnities and so on. All of these 
categories or social arrangements are non-corporeal constructs. None of them describes, engages 
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or discusses the user in “bodily terms.” In fact, there is hardly any evidence or reference to the body 
itself in the enhancement of learning or depiction of the learner-user. Very rarely, if at all, do we 
refer to learners or children as individuals with bodies, except by implication when we are talking 
about gender or gender-based practices or more signiﬁcantly when we are talking about 
cyborgisation. Within the cyborg construct, the body has parts that could be modelled, enhanced or 
replaced by technology (Ihde, 2002). Moreover, within the increased commodiﬁcation of education 
driven by neo-liberal ideologies and policies, individuals are expected to be machine-like, evaluated 
by performance-based grids based on mechanical strength and for the not so lucky ones, ultimately 
replaced by machines (Barnacle, 2009). 
 
In educational technology studies, may it be in digital literacies, e-learning, computer-mediated 
communication, and more recently, in TEL, we have ignored the role of the body in learning with the 
exception of the works of Barnacle and Dall’Alba (see Barnacle, 2009; Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2005, 
2007). It is seemingly obvious that the dispositions to learning that are acquired are as much 
corporeal as they are cognitive. This is illustrated in a recently accepted paper in this journal 
(Enriquez-Gibson, 2014), wherein the bodily positionings of students in relation to a rather old and 
non-digital technology—paper—are foregrounded. It describes the habituated bodily practice of 
studying and the mastery of study skills and routines as a bodily skill that remains to be meshed with 
paper. Yet the bodily aspect of technology-enhanced learning and its impact on cognition receive 
little attention within educational technology research. The absence of the body in educational 
technology research is greatly contrasted by the impressive force with which it has been increasingly 
central in other ﬁelds: cultural studies, media studies and human geography. The burgeoning 
literature on the human body has become central to the postmodern condition and feminist pursuits 
of deconstructing the male-dominated cultural constructions of the female body (Butler, 1990, 
1993). Post-structuralism encourages the promotion of the corporeal and social categories away 
from essentialist dispositions. However, according to Shakespeare and Watson (1995), under close 
scrutiny, the nature of the body it promotes is something of a phantom (simulacrum). There have 
been more materialist approaches that do acknowledge the importance of identity, co-presence, 
sensoriality, spatiality and mobility—though in such approaches, how corporeality itself affects or is 
affected by concrete situations or technologies remains unexamined. Instead, most scholars tend to 
objectify the body within a theoretical structure or present embodiment as a discursive construction 
(as text) that effaces ultimately its materiality. The point I am making here is not to suggest that 
“body talk” within textual and sociocultural analyses should be abandoned. I pursue and do value 
such scholarly pursuits and have made a few attempts of similar nature in my own work. The intent 
is to consider the somatic alongside the cultural body. In fact, the postmodernist displacement or 
dissolution of rationality and decentering of a coherent subject is central to how we might 
understand the process of embodiment and how this could articulate technology-related activities 
corporeally. Furthermore, the shift from knowledge to experience or practice presupposes the move 
from cognitive to embodied agency. This also brings into alignment at least in terms of corporeal 
feminism a critical scrutiny of the role of the body in technology use—that is, a body culture in 
technology. Everyday human life is marked by corporeal existence. The dualistic approach that has 
produced a theoretical rigidity has privileged the mind over the body and the relational approach 
that has promoted theoretical ﬂuidity has replaced the body with text. For a philosophy that puts 
back essences into existence, it is pertinent to consider, alongside the notion of reversibility, ﬂuidity 
of being as a useful concept or metaphor. 
 
The ﬁrst bold move in bringing educational technology research within the purview of discussions of 
the body and embodiment is to attend to the disappeared body and insist that the body make up 
subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) or that the body is “the very ‘stuff’ of subjectivity” (Grosz, 1994, 
p. ix). Hence, subjectivity becomes not simply a function of consciousness, but of bodily practice. 
Furthermore, subjectivity is always intersubjectivity; therefore, it is always intercorporeal (Crossley, 
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1995b). The body is always a body-with. The human–technology typology introduced by Don Ihde 
(1990, 2002) is suggested as a theoretical and methodological possibility to restore or recover the 
body in educational technology research. Secondly, it describes the use of body techniques based on 
Crossley’s “carnal sociology” (1995a) and interpretation of Mauss’s (1979) body techniques (see for 
examples, Crossley, 1995b, 2004) and intercorporeality (Crossley, 1995b, 2001, 2007) as 
methodologically viable approaches for a productive and expansive research agenda that is attentive 
to the embodied agency and bodily practices of digital literacies and TEL studies. 
 
Body as other 
It is broadly argued that the absence of the body has to do with the western mind–body divide or 
because mind is privileged over body. However, Crossley (2007) would not entirely agree. For him, 
citing the work of Leder (1990), it is due to the fact that the body is simply the anchor or point of 
view on the world. The body gives us a “standpoint” or locates us in the world. In The Absent Body, 
Leder (1990) refers to experience as embodied or that the body is the site of experience in a way 
that it is not an experience of the body itself. This, however, could be reversed in what Leder calls 
“dys-appearance”—an appearance of the body due to some dys-function. We neglect the body 
when it recedes from awareness, which is most of the time (Crossley, 2007). Only with various forms 
of corporeal breakdown do we pay attention to the body. At these times, the body appears as 
“other.” The body is deﬁned as the other in terms of “. . . a ﬁxed, material entity subject to the 
empirical rules of biological science, existing prior to the mutability and ﬂux of cultural change and 
diversity and characterised by exchangeable inner necessities” (Csordas, 1994, p. 6 cited in Hughes & 
Paterson, 1997, p. 329). In short, it is treated as a vessel—pre-social, inert, physical object quite 
distinct from the self. Cartesian dualism is built on this selected reﬂection of the body. A more 
reﬂective phenomenology reveals that the body in the world is both foreground and background. It 
constitutes our locus, so that we are “here” rather than “there.” Yet, at the same time, the body 
recedes from conscious reﬂection. The body recedes in activity but is always implicitly present and 
known. For instance, “to see something as reachable and thereby open to my use is to implicitly 
experience my body’s capacity of reach” (Leder, 1990, p. 22). Scholars like Foster (1992) and Crossley 
(2001) have provided vivid descriptions of how the dancing or boxing body can be manipulated 
through training and ultimately deﬁnes a meaningful personal (professional) identity—that of a 
dancer or Thai boxer. Such phenomena, including walking (Ingold & Vergunst, 2008) and surely, 
talking, suggest the possibility of a manipulable and malleable body—a plastic corporeality. This 
does not only change body movements, but ways of bodying imbued with embodied meaning. The 
body becomes different as it acquires different purpose and meaning by way of different techniques 
of “body-moves.” Hence, it is worthwhile to explore educational technology and understand 
human–technology relations through the concept of body techniques, where the materiality of the 
body is no longer just “other.”  
 
Body as ﬂesh 
A number of feminist scholars, particularly Grosz (1994), Barad (2003) and Wilson (2004), have re-
articulated the social body as a sensory (physiological and biological) beyond a cultural construction 
that excludes its visceral make-up through corporeal feminism. And yet, as Crossley (2007) pointed 
out, the body is strangely absent from the accounts not because of dualism but because we have not 
yet found a way to talk about the body as site of experience. Phenomenologists, who have adhered 
to Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) work, have pursued the conception of human embodiment that 
transcends the Cartesian dualism by grounding perception in the experienced and experiencing 
body. The world could only be experienced bodily and if at all the virtual is a kind of world, it is only 
experienced through the body. At this juncture, subjectivity or agency becomes not simply a 
function or matter of consciousness but of bodily practice. Understanding or learning is both a 




From Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) unﬁnished, posthumous manuscript, The Visible and the Invisible, his 
new conception of the body, as a “chiasm” or crossing over, combines subjective experience and 
objective existence. His term for this new conception of the body is “ﬂesh.” It extends his notion of 
reversibility to both “touching” and “touched” or tangible, and not just perceiving and perceived. 
Consider an instance when one hand is touching the other. The hand touching the other refers to 
the lived, subjective body and the other hand being touched is the objective, sensory body. The 
locus of our attention could easily traverse between the reversibility of the ﬂesh as both subjective 
and objective. This qualiﬁes Merleau-Ponty’s view that gives priority to the “phenomenal” (lived) 
body over the objective (visceral) body. Furthermore, the notion of reversibility makes the body 
simultaneously active (touching) and passive (touched). In the ﬂesh, the body is not just a body-
object that refers to biological organs. It is simultaneously a body-subject. It is always-already 
mediated by a range of social and cultural norms and technical means that affect its reception and 
mobility (Coole, 2007). The latter remains contingent and in-the-making. Digital practices are 
saturated with corporeal signiﬁcance and yet the body is usually used or reduced to a dramatic 
prosthesis in digital or textual performances. The cultural aspects of the body drawn and re-drawn 
given its plasticity have been criticised by Shakespeare and Watson (1995) as a mere shift from 
biological essentialism to discursive essentialism. This criticism is further conﬁrmed by the 
circulation of the “body-as-text” denying the body of its materiality (Brush, 1998; Butler, 1990, 
1993). I would argue alongside Bordo (1993) that the shift of focus on the body is not just another 
version of essentialism, that is, the body is not just a ﬂeshy entity. Though seemingly mundane 
habits and practices are carnal forms of culture. In short, culture is not just made by “intelligible” 
body, but also by a “practical” body (Bordo, 1993). 
 
The “practical” body is not brute biological or material entity. It, too, is a culturally mediated 
form; its activities are subject to interpretation and description. The shift to the practical 
dimension is not a turn to biology or nature, but to another “register”, as Foucault puts it, of 
the cultural body, the register of the “useful body” rather than the “intelligible body” (p. 
181). 
 
In an attempt to avoid an essentialist position, Ihde’s body typology and Mauss’s body techniques 
are proposed as frames or lenses through which the plastic and practical body is not reduced to a 
cultural medium or text. 
 
Body-tech relations 
The experience of technological mediation, from a post-phenomenological viewpoint, recognises the 
non-neutral capacity of technology use. Ihde (1990), Rosenberg (2013) and Verbeek (2008) are 
philosophers of technology who highlight how technology changes how the world is approached, 
understood, perceived and acted on by its user. The effects of technological mediation within the 
habitual aspects and embodied skills of everyday practice with technologies must be examined. This 
inter-relational ontology brings it to co-constitution of human and technologies, not simply a matter 
of mediation but also of body techniques described in the next section. 
 
As my intent is not only relational, but also corporeal, I would like to make an explicit discussion 
about human–technology relations by attending to the body-object or physical body. Once again, 
I am guided by the work of Ihde (1990, 2002), as I tried to articulate in an earlier paper (Enriquez, 
2011). Drawing from the traditions of phenomenology and hermeneutical philosophy, Ihde (1990) 
proposes a four-way typology based on our phenomenological engagement with technical artefacts. 
First, embodiment relations occur when a device becomes “incorporated” as a medium of 
perception. Such technologies characteristically “simultaneously magnify and amplify or reduce or 
place aside (screen out) what is (and is not) experienced through them” (Introna, 2011, p. 9). 
Examples would include the blind person’s stick and tools like the hammer. Second, hermeneutic 
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relations provide the body with a representation of the exter nal world or a reference of something 
beyond itself. GPS and compasses refer to such relations. Third, Ihde recognises alterity relations, in 
which a technical artefact presents itself as “other.” Technological encounters refer to other possible 
worlds (eg, playing video games) (Introna, 2011). And ﬁnally, there are background relations that 
refer to technologies that fade into the background of conscious experience and do not directly 
engaged the body (eg, trafﬁc control systems). 
 
Ihde’s human–technology relations largely refer to the visible. Verbeek (2008) has proposed two 
additional relations—cyborg and composite. The suggested extension of Ihde’s typology was based 
on the notion of cyborg intentionality. They may also be considered in terms of invisible mediation. 
Cyborg relations are deﬁned by unseen technological support, implants or replacements that are 
rather ﬁxed and permanent in deﬁning a hybrid body. Composite relations, though in my view are 
rather ill-deﬁned, are still useful in talking about those entities that are invisible because of lack of 
direct physical or visual encounter. The deciding factor if a human–technology relation is composite 
or hermeneutic depends on whose body is involved. The astronaut’s body has a hermeneutic 
relationship with the moon even in a body suit, but my bodily encounter would remain 
hermeneutical—a representation of that reality. With this simple example, I am not entirely 
convinced that a composite relation constructs (beyond representation) reality. It is merely a 
representation at a distance or out of the extraordinary. What is important to consider are the 




In this section, I rely heavily on Crossley’s work (2007) and interpretation of body techniques based 
on Mauss’s (1979) early sociology of the body. Body techniques are deﬁned as “ways from which 
from society to society men [sic] know how to use their bodies” (1979, p. 97 cited in Crossley, 2007, 
p. 85). For a more inclusive deﬁnition, I would suggest that “men” refers to all gender and ages. As a 
methodological tool, this concept transcends Cartesian dualism. It pulls into irreducible relations the 
social, physical and mental aspects of human being. Crossley (2007) elaborates on how these 
corporeal dimensions are co-constituted and may be elucidated in “observant participation” 
(Wacquant, 2004, 2011—brieﬂy described below): 
1. Social techniques refer to the collective whose properties are not merely the sum of 
individual skills. They are manifested in and through individual actions and yet they pre-exist 
and will outlive particular individuals. In short, they are also historical “social f acts” that are 
communicated and circulated in communities and networks. 
2. Physical techniques refer to the ways in which we “use” our bodies within the potentials and 
constraints of our anatomical structure. 
3. Mental techniques refer to practical knowledge and understanding beyond mechanical 
movements of the body. For instance, swimming is not just the execution of a set of bodily 
movements in a particular pattern or sequence. 
 
The embodied knowledge or learning that is foregrounded through body techniques is 
conceptualised as a habitus, that is, forms of practical reason manifested and performed differently 
in various contexts. In this paper, habitus of a digital kind is foregrounded within Ihde’s human–
technology relations. 
 
In an ethnography of corporeality, body techniques make “the body” or “embodiment” a tangible 
concept and researchable format to investigate embodied agency and subjectivity in educational 
technology research. It allows us to explore a range of practices—digital literacies and TEL—in bodily 
terms. An ethnographer can observe the process of learning or interaction and immersed his or her 
body to its techniques using “observant participation.” The data that are produced in ﬁeld notes and 
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interviews, for instance, will emphasise the point that the materiality of the body is not merely 
corporeal, but also technical. Body techniques are not obvious to everyone or anyone. They are 
learned or acquired in practical competence where some are better than others. In particular 
settings and situations, our body techniques enact particular body language that confers meaning on 
objects, places and other material things. Therefore, they structure the way in which we act. It must 
be added that other material elements affect the body, especially when we are dealing with 
technical artefacts. 
 
If to learn to see colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, then to learn how to use technology 
of any kind or application is to acquire a certain style of communicating/doing. It is not just a matter 
of sight or technological affordances but a matter of body techniques. “Perception therefore 
involves body techniques and perceptual meaning is shaped by such techniques” (Crossley, 2007, p. 
91). As the non-humans’ (eg, artefacts) materiality and agency are integral to a relational ontology 
for the multiple possibilities of educational projects, body techniques have widespread symbolic and 
material connotation within individualised and collective context of social interaction. Body 
techniques are not things unto themselves acted out by a single individual. They are collectives that 
are both performative and co-productive, whether consciously or unconsciously to some-body. 
 
Observant participation 
Body techniques translate the body or embodiment into researchable format in body–technology 
relations both quantitatively and qualitatively (Crossley, 2007). To study body techniques is to 
engage in embodied ethnography and “observant participation” (Wacquant, 2004, 2011) must be 
considered. Observant participation means active membership that encourages bodily immersion. 
Body movements manifest particular patterns of body techniques. Ethnographic research by way of 
observant participation can be used to note down or record aspects of how body techniques are 
developed and acquired through social diffusion (Crossley, 2007). As a starting point, one of the key 
mechanisms to access embodied practice is to attend to the following:  
1. Technical aspect refers to what is actually passed on through the body in relation to a 
particular technology in terms of Ihde’s basic typology identiﬁed above. 
2. Cognitive/perceptual aspect refers to what meanings are attached to body techniques; these 
may be clariﬁed and further explored in interviews. 
3. Social aspect refers to what diffusion or network patterns are necessary to establish body 
techniques in human–technology relations. 
To survey patterns of body techniques and the process of diffusion, Crossley (2007) suggests that 
quantitative approaches are employed and that observation data include their frequencies and 
duration within social networks. 
 
To illustrate the value of the ethnography of corporeality, I would brieﬂy mention Mangen’s (2010) 
work on children’s reading and literacy development. Her work refers to the key mechanisms above 
in terms of the manner in which the use of digital technologies and touchscreens challenges the 
associated bodily habits of children as these are challenged by new physical ergonomic, perceptual 
and cognitive processes and actions. Two key features that Mangen have highlighted in her work 
that are useful phenomenological consideration when investigating the evolution of body 
techniques in relation to body–technology relations are the tangibility of the physical versus the 
intangibility of digital displays of technological platforms and the multisensory nature of the 
interaction or human–technology relation. 
 
At the level of Ihde’s embodiment relations, body techniques can shed light on the embodied 
relationship between bodily sensorimotor, perceptual and cognitive features, and various 
technological interfaces. To make this point more poignant, touch at the interface reveals that the 
hands have a role to play in teaching and learning, particularly in teaching young children how to 
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read. Hands are not only used for gestural purposes or non-verbal communication, but more 
speciﬁcally in the haptic and tactile interactions with different objects and technological devices. In 
short, doing research on the pedagogical potential of touchscreens, in terms of body techniques, 
the changing role of the hands must be considered. 
 
So, bodily speaking . . . 
The importance of the body in human–technology relations has been largely ignored in educational 
technology research. Even when its importance is acknowledged, its corporeal and perceptual 
dimensions tend to be neglected. Building on Don Ihde’s typology of human–technology relations, I 
have argued for carnal ethnography to retrain our corporeal sensibility and sensitivity in technology-
related ﬁelds of technology-enhanced learning and digital literacies. 
 
A practicable methodological approach based on Crossley’s (2007) adaptation of Mauss’s 
conceptualisation of body techniques becomes an important ethnographic consideration when 
exploring the transformation of user experience and diffusion of technology use in material, bodily 
terms. For instance, “point-and-click” on the screen allows for the evolution of body techniques in 
relation to literacy development in children. Body techniques are not just mechanical and external 
manipulations on the material world (Ingold, 1997). They are properties of systems of relations 
constituted by both human and non-human elements. 
 
The proposed carnal ethnography does not intend to shift the focus on the body at the expense of 
the mind. To do so, as Watkins (2011) pointed out, is a mere reversal and would still allow for a 
continued disconnect between mind and body. Moreover, the new research agenda of corporeal 
persuasions must not simply move from technological to corporeal determinism. Therefore, it is 
important to avoid Mauss’s mistake of de-contextualising body techniques and habits and ignoring 
the question of why there are multiple ways of “doing the body” in a diffused system of human–
technology relations (Crossley, 2007). 
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